• India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, under the theme “Building Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability” and the broader focus “Humanity First.”
• The summit was significant amid the US-Iran war, Strait of Hormuz disruptions, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and US tariff threats against BRICS countries.
• PM Modi held key bilateral meetings with Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines.

• BRICS is an informal grouping of major emerging economies, originally conceptualised by Goldman Sachs analysts in 2001 as “BRIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, China), with South Africa joining in 2010.
• After the 2024 expansion (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and Indonesia’s entry in 2025, total membership reached 11 countries, alongside roughly 10 partner countries.
• It represents nearly 50% of world population, 40% of global GDP, and over 25% of global trade.
• Its share of global GDP (PPP terms) rose from 17% to 35% between 1995 and 2024, surpassing the G7.
• Institutional pillars: New Development Bank (NDB) (2015) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) (2015).
• This was India’s fourth time chairing BRICS and its fourth time hosting a BRICS-related summit (2012, 2016, 2021-virtual, 2026).

• Common stand against terrorism — unequivocal condemnation and commitment to combat terrorism in all forms.
• People-centric “Humanity First” approach — outcomes framed around benefits for women, farmers, and entrepreneurs.
• Push for global governance reform — consensus on reforming the UN, IMF and World Bank, and support for India’s UNSC bid.
• Voice of the Global South — BRICS positioning itself as representing developing-nation priorities in the emerging world order.
• Repositioning as development-oriented, not security-driven — significant at a time when China and Russia have sought to give BRICS a harder security/military edge.
• Over 50 tangible outcomes across resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, including a BRICS Digital Centre of Excellence for Smart Grids, a Logistics Supply Chain Cooperation Framework, Centres of Excellence on Agro-Ecology, and a proposed Joint BRICS Insurance Company ($10 billion initial capital, proposed by Iran).
• Finance Ministers’ joint statement flagged “serious concerns” over unilateral tariffs as inconsistent with WTO rules, and pushed for merit-based EMDE representation in IMF/World Bank leadership.
• The unresolved paragraph — negotiators struggled to finalise the “Delhi Declaration” due to an Iran-UAE disagreement over language on attacks in West Asia, with a possible compromise around “universal condemnation of violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty” without naming any country.

• Modi-Putin: Discussed boosting bilateral trade to USD 100 billion by 2030 (from the current USD 65 billion), civil nuclear cooperation, defence, energy, and the safety of Indian seafarers in the Black Sea.
• Modi-Pezeshkian (Iran): First visit by an Iranian President to India since 2018. Discussions focused on freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, energy security, and reviving India-Iran cooperation, including projects like Chabahar Port.
• Modi-Xi Jinping: Xi’s first visit to India in seven years, seen as a step toward normalisation after the 2020 Galwan standoff. Discussions covered border stabilisation, the trade imbalance (India’s trade deficit with China has tripled from $38 billion to $113 billion since 2014), and restoration of economic ties.

• The NDB still has half its bonds denominated in US dollars, with local-currency lending at only ~22% against a 30% target.
• The NDB froze operations related to Russia in 2022 to protect its own Western credit ratings (S&P, Fitch, Moody’s) — bloc solidarity yielding to global financial discipline.
• The CRA, a $100 billion crisis pool meant to rival the IMF, has never been activated in a decade — any country wanting to draw more than 30% of its share must still approach the IMF, defeating its stated purpose.
• The word “de-dollarisation” does not appear even once in the 126-point Rio Declaration (2025); Putin himself stated Russia has “not sought to abandon the dollar.”

The China Factor — An Internal Imbalance

• China’s GDP ($20.85 trillion) is now more than double that of the other four founding BRICS members combined.
• China’s rise has fundamentally altered BRICS’s original purpose — to challenge industrialised-economy dominance — since China itself is now that industrialised superpower.

India’s Strategic Calculus — “Non-Western,” Not “Anti-Western”

• India consistently frames BRICS as a “non-Western” rather than “anti-Western” grouping — a subtle but important distinction from the China-Russia framing.
• India continues to oppose a common BRICS currency, fearing US tariff retaliation — reflecting a preference for strategic autonomy over bloc alignment.
• India simultaneously deepens ties with the US, EU (India-EU FTA nearing completion), and Quad partners — a multi-alignment foreign policy rather than binary bloc politics.

Vulnerabilities of Overdependence on the Western Order

• Sanctions weaponisation: Of 1,325 global sanctions since 1949, 486 have been imposed by the US alone (per former RBI Governor Urjit Patel’s research) — making it the “hegemonic sanctioner.”
• Patent monopolies: India and South Africa’s 2020 attempt to secure a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines was rejected by developed nations.
• Trade barriers: The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is seen by BRICS nations as a disguised protectionist tool.

Geopolitical Fault Lines Within BRICS

• The Iran-UAE divide over West Asia language shows how an expanded, ideologically diverse BRICS struggles for consensus, unlike the original five-member format.
• Brazil’s internal political transition and South Africa’s cautious stance on a common currency further illustrate the bloc’s lack of unified purpose.
• Expansion (2024-25) has made BRICS “too big to fail” but also too diverse to have one clear voice — a key analytical tension examiners often test.

India-China Dynamics Within a Multilateral Setting

• Xi’s visit, alongside troop disengagement since 2024 and resumption of direct flights and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, signals gradual normalisation.
• However, structural issues — trade deficit, market access, and lingering strategic distrust post-Galwan — mean multilateral bonhomie does not automatically translate into bilateral resolution.

• Diplomatic capital: Successfully hosting a summit of this scale and diversity — akin to the G20 Presidency in 2023 — enhances India’s credentials as a global convenor and bridge-builder.
• Economic diversification: Deepening trade with Russia (energy), Iran (connectivity via Chabahar), and China (investment normalisation) helps India diversify supply chains.
• Institutional reform advocacy: India’s push for UNSC reform and IMF/World Bank quota realignment strengthens its long-term rule-making claim.
• Balancing multiple alignments: India engaged simultaneously with US-aligned Gulf states, Western-sanctioned states (Russia, Iran), and China — without compromising Quad or Indo-Pacific commitments.

• Divergent member interests: Iran, UAE and Saudi Arabia’s competing security concerns limit the bloc’s ability to issue unified statements on regional conflicts.
• China’s dominance risk: Growing asymmetry could allow China to informally set the bloc’s agenda despite India’s chairmanship this year.
• Limited institutional teeth: The NDB and CRA remain financially modest compared to the World Bank and IMF.