SHANTI Bill 2025: Transforming India’s Nuclear Energy Landscape

Syllabus: Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their design and implementation.

Context and Background

  • Nuclear power contributed only around 3% of India’s electricity generation in 2024–25.
  • Government has set a target of 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047.
  • Target includes deployment of at least five indigenous Small Modular Reactors by 2033.

Purpose and Scope of SHANTI Bill

  • SHANTI Bill proposes changes in legal authority to build and operate civil nuclear facilities.
  • It allows the Centre to license nuclear activities beyond traditional government operators.
  • Licences may be issued to government entities, joint ventures, and other companies, subject to conditions.
  • The intended new operators are primarily domestic private capital, not foreign plant owners.

Rationale for Private Participation

  • Achieving the 100 GW target requires substantial mobilisation of financial capital.
  • Allowing licensed non-government entities helps share construction and investment risks.
  • The Bill retains state control over sensitive fuel cycles to prevent proliferation risks.
  • Private participation is permitted mainly in plant delivery and supply chain segments.

Regulatory and Economic Implications

  • SHANTI consolidates safety, enforcement, dispute resolution, and participation terms in one statute.
  • This clarity may reduce legal ambiguity faced by new entrants.
  • It could lower transaction costs and shorten site approval and commissioning timelines.

Liability Provisions and Concerns

  • Maximum operator liability for a nuclear incident is capped at ₹3,000 crore.
  • The Centre bears liability beyond the cap and may assume full liability in public interest.
  • These provisions ease investment risk but raise concerns on victim compensation adequacy.

Insurance, Supplier Liability, and Accountability

  • Operators must maintain insurance or financial security, but Central installations are exempted.
  • Operator recourse against suppliers exists only through explicit contracts or proven intent to harm.
  • Supplier accountability may therefore vary across projects, depending on contractual terms.

Regulatory Independence and Governance Issues

  • SHANTI establishes a statutory framework for nuclear governance.
  • However, appointment powers remain with the Centre and Atomic Energy Commission.
  • Limited regulatory independence may undermine public trust and discourage investor confidence.

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