Syllabus: Parliament and State legislatures
Context: Supreme Court warned Telangana Speaker of “gross contempt” for delaying decision on disqualification petitions against 10 BRS MLAs who defected to Congress.
Anti-Defection Law
- Background and Evolution
- Frequent political defections in the 1950s–60s created instability, symbolised by the phrase “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram.”
- To address this, the Anti-Defection Law was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985, adding the Tenth Schedule.
- It aimed to curb defections motivated by personal gain, applying to Parliament and State Assemblies.
- The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 removed the one-third split provision, permitted mergers only with two-thirds support, and barred defectors from holding ministerial or paid political posts until re-elected.
- Grounds for Disqualification
- A member is disqualified for voluntarily giving up party membership, inferred from conduct.
- Voting or abstaining against the party whip invites disqualification.
- An independent member joining a political party faces disqualification.
- A nominated member joining a party after six months also faces disqualification.
- Role of the Presiding Officer
- Disqualification cases are decided by the Speaker or Chairman, whose neutrality has been frequently questioned.
- Exceptions
- No disqualification if two-thirds members support a merger with another party.
- Speaker/Chairman/Deputy Chairman may resign from their party to remain neutral without disqualification.
Criticisms of the Anti-Defection Law
- Democratic and Institutional Concerns
- The law imposes a curb on dissent, preventing lawmakers from voting by conscience.
- Party leadership uses the whip to suppress internal debate.
- Speaker’s bias and delays undermine neutrality since there is no fixed time limit for decisions.
- Structural Weaknesses
- The two-thirds merger provision encourages horse-trading and unethical political bargaining.
- Opaque communication of party whips leads to disputes on whether legislators received due notice.
Supreme Court’s Stance
- Ensuring Timeliness and Neutrality
- In Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020), the SC directed that defection cases be decided within three months, and suggested an independent tribunal for neutrality.
- In Ravi S. Naik (1994), the SC held that the Speaker must act as a neutral adjudicator, and defections may be inferred without a formal resignation.
- In Kihoto Hollohan (1992), the SC allowed judicial review of the Speaker’s decisions for mala fides or constitutional violations.
- In Padi Kaushik Reddy (2025), the SC urged Parliament to reform the law and reconsider the Speaker’s role.
Way Forward
- Restrict disqualification to votes affecting government stability, such as confidence motions or budget votes.
- Transfer adjudication power to an independent body like the Election Commission, as suggested by ARC.
- Establish a clear statutory time limit to prevent strategic delays.
- Improve intra-party democracy, as recommended by the 170th Law Commission Report.
- Ensure transparency in whips by mandating public and digital notification.
- Strengthen enforcement through time-bound, transparent procedures, as proposed by several committees, including Dinesh Goswami (1990) and Halim Committee (1994).