India–China boundary issue

Why in News: India and China held the 24th round of Special Representatives’ talks in August 2025 to discuss the long-pending boundary settlement. The talks revisited the 2005 Political Parameters Agreement and decided on steps like an “early harvest” settlement of the Sikkim–Tibet boundary and creation of new border management mechanisms.

Introduction

  • The unresolved India–China boundary issue remains one of the longest-standing disputes in modern international relations. 
  • Despite decades of talks, including the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism launched in 2003, the border remains indeterminate. 
  • The lack of a settlement not only fuels periodic crises such as Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020), but also hampers the full realisation of Sino-Indian relations in trade, connectivity, and regional cooperation.

Background of the Border Issue

  • Post-1962 War: Boundary disputes left unresolved.
  • 1979 Vajpayee Visit: First high-level contact post-war, initiated normalisation but India was not ready for a border deal despite Deng Xiaoping’s openness.
  • 1990s–2000s: Confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
  • 2003 Initiative: Prime Minister Vajpayee proposed appointment of Special Representatives for a political settlement.
  • 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters: Only negotiated document outlining principles for settlement.

2005 Political Parameters Agreement – Key Features

  • Strategic Objective: Settlement of the boundary issue as vital for advancing bilateral ties.
  • Political Perspective: Move away from purely historical-legal claims.
  • Natural Features: Boundary to follow well-defined geographical landmarks.
  • Strategic Interests (Article IV): Consideration of each other’s security and strategic needs.
  • Settled Populations (Article VII): Interests of populations in border areas to be safeguarded.
  • Implied Formula: “As is where is” → China retains Aksai Chin; India retains Arunachal Pradesh.

Progress and Setbacks

  • Consensus Building: By 2013, SRs reportedly reached an 18-point framework; alignment basis agreed in some sectors (e.g., Sikkim–Tibet).
  • China’s Reversal: 2007 onwards, Beijing reasserted claims over Tawang despite earlier acceptance of settled populations principle.
  • Informal Understandings: Border trijunctions with Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan acknowledged to require third-party consultation.
  • Crisis Interruptions: Chumar (2014), Doklam (2017), Galwan (2020) eroded trust, paused talks between 2019–24.

Present Scenario (2025)

  • 24th SR Round (Aug 2025): Reiterated commitment to the 2005 Political Parameters.

Tasks Assigned:

  • “Early harvest” settlement of the Sikkim–Tibet boundary.
  • Establishment of an expert group to propose framework for full settlement.
  • New border management mechanisms to prevent 2020-type clashes.
  • Ground Reality: Heavy troop deployments continue on both sides; CBMs of 1996 and subsequent agreements have failed to ensure stability.

Challenges

1. Strategic Distrust: Each side views the other as a long-term rival.

2. Domestic Politics: Nationalist sentiments make concessions politically costly.

3. Tawang Dispute: China insists on claim; India cannot concede due to settled populations and religious significance.

4. Military Build-up: Escalatory deployments along the LAC.

5. Linkage with Larger Geopolitics: Indo-Pacific strategy, Quad, and China–Pakistan nexus complicate settlement.

The Way Ahead

  • Political Will: Settlement requires leadership-level decision; technical talks alone insufficient.
  • Implement 2005 Agreement: Adherence to strategic interests and settled population clauses.
  • Early Sectoral Settlements: Progress in Sikkim and other less-contested sectors to build trust.
  • New CBMs: Reduce troop presence, establish hotline mechanisms, expand buffer zones.
  • Broader Engagement: Link boundary settlement with trade, climate, and regional stability for mutual incentive.
  • Regional Peace Dividend: A settled border could reduce defence expenditure, foster connectivity, and enable joint leadership in Asia.

Conclusion

A durable settlement requires political courage on both sides to accept that there is little to gain and much to lose by keeping the border unsettled. A resolved boundary could transform bilateral ties and contribute significantly to Asian stability in the 21st century.

GS Paper I (Post-Independence History):

  • Evolution of India–China relations after 1962 war.

GS Paper II (International Relations):

  • India–China boundary dispute and Special Representatives’ mechanism.

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