• Allegations of victimisation, maladministration, arbitrary case allocation and nepotism have been made against Rajasthan High Court Acting Chief Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma.
• Supreme Court judge Justice Sandeep Mehta reportedly sought his transfer through letters to the CJI.
• Following lawyers’ protests, the Supreme Court Collegium recommended a new Chief Justice for the Rajasthan High Court on August 31, raising concerns over judicial accountability and transparency.

Background

• Justice Mehta is said to have flagged how Justice Sharma misused his position as the “master of the roster” — the administrative power of the Chief Justice to allocate cases to particular Benches.
• It is alleged that cases were selectively shifted to favourable Benches, judges were intimidated with transfer threats, and there was favouritism towards select lawyers and nepotism in Permanent Lok Adalat appointments.
• Justice Sharma was earlier transferred to Patna HC in 2022, his 2023 repatriation request was rejected, yet he was retransferred to Rajasthan in 2025 and made Acting Chief Justice — a sequence seen as an institutional inconsistency.

1. The Judicial Accountability Deficit

• India lacks an effective, time-bound mechanism to investigate misconduct against sitting judges of the higher judiciary.
• The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is outdated and rarely invoked in practice.
• In K. Veeraswami vs Union of India (1991), the Supreme Court held that even registering an FIR against a High Court or Supreme Court judge requires the CJI’s prior permission — making criminal investigation nearly impossible without evidence that can only be gathered through investigation itself.
• The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2012, which sought an independent oversight mechanism, lapsed with the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha and was never revived.
• Impeachment under Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) is politically difficult, as impeachment motions rarely succeed due to the high threshold of a special majority in both Houses.
• The in-house inquiry mechanism adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 lacks statutory backing, transparency, and enforceability.

2. Collegium System and Appointment-Related Concerns

• There is no publicly known criteria for elevation, transfer, or repatriation decisions.
• The process involves an unavoidable Executive-Judiciary interface at the Centre, making it prone to being seen as partisan or arbitrary.
• Unlike India, Canada uses an application-based selection process, and the UK has an independent Judicial Appointments Commission — both more transparent alternatives.

3. Role and Responsibility of the CJI

• Despite receiving three specific, evidence-backed letters from a sitting Supreme Court judge, the CJI reportedly did not act for several weeks, citing “established institutional mechanisms.”
• In 1990, CJI Sabyasachi Mukharji advised Justice V. Ramaswami to go on leave during an ongoing inquiry; CJI Venkatachaliah later refused him judicial work even after impeachment failed in Parliament.
• In 2024, when burnt currency notes were found at Justice Yashwant Varma’s residence, CJI Sanjiv Khanna promptly transferred him and ensured he was not given judicial work.

4. Public Trust and the Judiciary’s Image

• Corruption allegations are isolated instances, not indicative of the entire judiciary — overgeneralising can unfairly damage the reputation of judges who function with integrity.
• At the same time, repeated incidents without visible consequences erode public confidence in the rule of law over time.

5. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

• Judicial independence is a basic structure feature of the Constitution (Kesavananda Bharati) — any external mechanism to regulate judicial conduct must not compromise it.
• Too much executive involvement risks compromising independence; too little accountability risks unchecked misconduct — this balance is the central examiner’s angle.