India has said that the situation on the India-China border is disturbed from time to time when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns, after the head of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) spoke of continuing face-offs at several places in Arunachal Pradesh.

• 1962: The war left the Ladakh border and territory in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh as lasting sources of mistrust.
• 1988: The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China began a thaw, and allowed the border question to be handled separately from other ties.
• 2003: The Special Representatives mechanism was set up to seek a boundary settlement.
• 2005: The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles agreement said that neither side would use or threaten force and that the interests of settled populations in border areas would be protected.
• 2020: The Galwan Valley clash (June 2020) killed 20 Indian soldiers and brought the worst fall in ties in decades.
• 2024: The patrolling arrangement and the Prime Ministers’ meeting at the BRICS summit in Kazan restarted dialogue.

• Undefined border: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is not delineated on the ground, so each patrol can be seen as a face-off. In the east, the McMahon Line was left imprecisely marked.
• Mistrust: India sees China’s actions as a threat. China views India’s closeness to the Quad as an effort to contain it, and sees little reason to improve ties.
• Zero-sum view: Many steps by both sides are seen as gains for one at the other’s cost.
• Poor understanding: Analysts say India and China read each other’s intentions poorly.

• Costly conflict: A war would set back both, and would harm China’s 2049 goal of becoming the leading power.
• No natural rivalry: Analysts argue that there is no inevitable reason for the two civilisations to clash, and that neither side has an edge in the high Himalayas.
• Realism: China’s military is advanced but not yet world-class, and India can hold its own in the Himalayas.
• Stable ties: The phrase “constructive relationship of strategic stability” used in US-China talks could apply to India-China ties too.

• Pending de-escalation: India calls the steps “three Ds”: disengagement (done in October 2024), then de-escalation and de-induction of troops, which are still being negotiated.
• Recurrent face-offs: Patrolling deviations, as reported in Arunachal Pradesh, can escalate if communication fails.
• Trust deficit: Years after Galwan, trust is low on both sides.

• Length: The boundary is about 3,488 km by India’s estimate (China says about 2,000 km). The LAC is not demarcated or mutually agreed in many stretches.
• LAC: The de facto boundary, in three sectors: Western (Ladakh), Middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) and Eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh).
• Western Sector: Aksai Chin (about 38,000 sq km) is under Chinese control, and China also holds the Shaksgam Valley (about 5,180 sq km), which Pakistan ceded in 1963.
• Friction points in Ladakh: Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Depsang Plains, Demchok, Chumar and Gogra-Hot Springs.
• Pangong Tso: A landlocked lake at over 14,000 ft. On its north bank, India claims up to Finger 8 and China up to Finger 2.
• Depsang Plains: Near Daulat Beg Oldi, linked by the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road.
• Middle Sector: The dispute is minor, and this is the only sector where maps have been exchanged.
• McMahon Line: About 890 km, drawn at the Simla Convention, 1914 between British India and Tibet. India accepts it, and China rejects it.
• Arunachal Pradesh: China claims about 90,000 sq km as “South Tibet”, especially Tawang, home to the Tawang Monastery.
• Eastern flashpoints: Yangtse (December 2022), Naku La (2020) and Nathu La and Cho La (1967).
• Doklam: The India-Bhutan-China tri-junction, with a stand-off in 2017.
• Clashes: The 1962 war, Tulung La (1975) and Galwan (June 2020), which killed 20 Indian soldiers.
• Agreements on the LAC: 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 (created the WMCC) and 2013 (Border Defence Cooperation Agreement).
• Talks: The Special Representatives mechanism has run since 2003 (25th round: 25 August 2026). The October 2024 arrangement ended the stand-off at Depsang and Demchok, but buffer zones remain at Galwan, Gogra, Hot Springs and Pangong Tso.
• “Three Ds”: Disengagement (done), then de-escalation and de-induction.
• LAC versus LoC: The LoC with Pakistan is delineated on maps (Simla Agreement, 1972), while the LAC is not.