• The 18th BRICS Summit was held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, with India as chair.
• The summit gained importance due to the ongoing Iran conflict and rising great-power rivalry. Leaders from Iran, Russia, China and other members participated, and India helped achieve consensus on the Delhi Declaration.
• The summit highlights BRICS as a key platform for multipolarity and India’s strategic autonomy.

1. Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment

• India follows strategic autonomy (decisions based on national interest) and multi-alignment (ties with multiple major powers). BRICS allows engagement with Russia, China and Iran alongside the U.S. partnership — but India must avoid direct involvement in the U.S.–China rivalry.

2. Geopolitical Dimension: West Asia

• West Asia matters for India’s energy security, remittances, trade routes and the diaspora. Platforms like BRICS and SCO let India engage multiple sides and present a balanced position without harming bilateral relations, even as Pakistan sought to project itself as a mediator.

3. India–China and India–U.S. Dimensions

• India and China are strategic competitors on the border, yet economic partners within BRICS/SCO — such forums act as guardrails for peaceful competition, not a solution to the border dispute.
• India–U.S. ties remain a key strategic partnership, but tariffs and Russia-related sanctions create friction — India must maintain strong U.S. relations while keeping other options open.

4. Economic, Financial & Global South Dimensions

• BRICS institutions — the New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) — seek fairer trade/financial rules and greater representation in the IMF/World Bank. India supports more payment options without opposing the U.S. dollar.
• India presents itself as a voice of the Global South, pushing UNSC and institutional reform — though BRICS members don’t always agree on who gets permanent seats.

5. Security and Internal Contradictions

• Members cooperate on AI governance, climate change and terrorism language in joint statements — but differing political systems and India–China/Russia tensions mean internal contradictions also prevent any single country from dominating the group.

• BRICS as a hedge, not a bloc: India uses BRICS to keep multiple strategic options open — not as an anti-Western platform.
• Internal differences as a strength: divergent member interests make it hard for any one country to dominate or turn BRICS into a tightly-aligned alliance.
• Strategic autonomy means having options: India strengthens U.S. ties while maintaining Russia/China relations, avoiding excessive dependence on any one power.
• BRICS vs G7: G7 largely represents the Western-led order; BRICS gives emerging/developing countries another platform for global governance discussions, supporting India’s multipolarity goal.

• Managing India–China rivalry while cooperating within BRICS on shared interests.
• Balancing active BRICS participation without signalling a drift from the U.S. strategic partnership.
• Maintaining consensus among members with differing interests, such as Iran and the UAE.
• Ensuring concrete outcomes beyond declarations — in development finance, trade, technology and institutional reform.
• Managing financial differences carefully on local-currency and alternative payment discussions.
• Preserving strategic autonomy so BRICS strengthens options without dependence on any major power.